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Abstract
Some approaches to Model-Based Testing focus on test
case generation from assertions (operation pre- and post-
conditions) and invariants, e.g., written in the Object Con-
straint Language. In such a setting, assertions must be val-
idated. Validation is often carried out via executing scenar-
ios wherein system operations are applied, to detect unsat-
isﬁed invariants or failed preconditions. This paper aims
to improve the understanding of how to write useful vali-
dation scenarios for assertions in OCL. To do so, we re-
port on our experiences during the creation and execution
of 237 scenarios for validating assertions for the Mondex
Smart Card application, and describe several observations
that can help to improve the process of writing these sce-
narios. We also describe the important factors that must
be considered in transforming these scenarios into abstract
test cases.
1 Introduction
Model-Driven Development (MDD) is based on the idea
of making models – abstract, rigorous descriptions, e.g., in
UML – of software systems ﬁrst-class artefacts in the de-
velopment process. In MDD, software and systems models
can be used for automatically and semi-automatically deriv-
ing other artefacts needed within the engineering process,
such as code and test cases. Applying MDD in practice re-
quires well-deﬁned modelling languages, scalable and prac-
tical tools for constructing models, as well as means for val-
idating models before they are used in downstream activi-
ties, such as testing and run-time systems management.
In this paper, we analyse the applicability and suitability
of using UML and the Object Constraint Language (OCL)
together for creating scenarios in order to validate the as-
sertions of the operations within the model and to gener-
ate abstract test cases. We focus particularly on the use of
OCL preconditions, postconditions, and invariants in test
case generation. A critical issue in using assertions and in-
variants in test case generation is how to validate the asser-
tions. This is often done by creating scenarios that exercise
the assertions [8, 1] and show that the assertions are satisﬁ-
able (i.e., that there is at least one instance of the model that
allows an operation to execute successfully). The beneﬁt of
this approach to validation is that, potentially, the scenarios
can also be used directly for abstract test case generation.
In this study, instead of following the traditional ap-
proach in object oriented software development where a
scenario is a linear sequence of interactions between the
system and the actor (e.g. a user) in a particular use case,
we created scenarios that exercise the system by targeting
assertions. In other words, each scenario veriﬁes that a par-
ticular assertion is satisﬁable or falsiﬁable.
The discipline of writing scenarios that allow both to val-
idate models from this perspective and generate test cases
from the scenarios is not yet fully understood. Thus, this
paper aims at improving the understanding of how to val-
idate assertions by reporting on the results of a large-scale
experiment in which validation scenarios were written and
used to check assertions. By doing so, we aim to provide a
structured set of observations from this set of experiments
that provide advice on how to go about validating assertions
in a scenario-based way and to use them as a basis for test
case generation.
In the rest of this section, we give a brief overview of
the system that was investigated in the aforementioned ex-
periment, and the contribution of this paper is explained
more precisely. In Section 2, the observations made during
the creation and execution of scenarios are categorised and
discussed. Finally, Section 3 outlines our plans for future
work.
1.1 Mondex Smart Card Application
The software system that was used as the basis of our
validation experiment was the Mondex Smart Card Appli-
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cation. Mondex is a global electronic payment scheme that
provides digital form of cash [2]. The card holds values
in several different currencies and provides direct money
transfer without signature, PIN or transaction authorization
between card holders [3].
Mondex was the ﬁrst case study carried out in the imple-
mentation of the Grand Challenge program that aims to pop-
ulate a repository of formally speciﬁed and veriﬁed codes
that are useful in practice and serve as examples for the fu-
ture applications [4]. Various groups have been focusing
on this goal and have based their research on the mono-
graph that outlined the speciﬁcations, reﬁnement and proof
details of Mondex in Z [5]. As mentioned in our earlier
work [11], our efforts follow a different path in the sense
that we created the model of the system from the informal
requirements detailed in [3]. In doing so, we covered some
of the functional requirements omitted in [5] and in all the
other studies that have been based on this monograph.
In our experiment, we modelled the system using UML
and OCL in USE tool. USE allows users to specify sys-
tem models, invariants, and pre- and postconditions tex-
tually, and allows assertions to be checked. It provides a
multi-level platform where the model is deﬁned in a .use
ﬁle, the generation of an instance of the model is managed
by an .assl ﬁle, the extra optional invariants are imposed in
a .invs ﬁle and all these ﬁles as well as other USE-related
commands are executed by calling .cmd ﬁles in command
prompt of the tool.
A version of the class diagram of the Mondex Smart
Card application is given in Figure 1. The system has 30
invariants, the classes given in Figure 1 have 31 operations
and 197 assertions were written in order to cover these oper-
ations. These numbers exclude utility classes such as Date
and their associated operations.
Figure 1. Class Diagram - Mondex
1.2 Validation of Assertions and Genera-
tion of Abstract Test Cases
Validation is a crucial phase of the software development
process in demonstrating that the system under investi-
gation meets the requirements set. Assertion validation
ensures that pre and postconditions of operations within the
system are set as they are intended, i.e., they do not allow
operations to function outside of their range. There are
three ways of tackling this issue:
1. checking that the preconditions, state invariants and
postconditions of the operation under investigation
(OpuI) are satisﬁed at least once.
2. ensuring that the OpuI does not run when at least one
of the preconditions is failed.
3. checking that at least one of the postconditions of the
OpuI fails when a mutant is inserted into the operation
provided that the preconditions and the state invariants
are satisﬁed.
The ﬁrst item above guarantees that the postconditions of
the operation are not too strong and that there is at least one
case where preconditions and state invariants are satisﬁed.
The second item aims to check the response of the system
for when the preconditions are not satisﬁed. Finally, the last
item veriﬁes that the harmful modiﬁcations to the operation
are caught by the postconditions and that the postconditions
are not too weak.
Note that in the context of test case generation, the scenarios
created for the ﬁrst item may be used to generate positive
test cases, and the scenarios for the second item generate
negative test cases in the sense that they test the system to
observe its behaviour for unexpected situations. These two
items are similar in the sense that they can both be classiﬁed
under black-box testing. The third item, however, needs
mutants to be generated and inserted into the system, and
therefore the type of testing performed at this stage is white-
box testing.
The structure of the scenarios we created in our experi-
ment is given in Table 1. Each scenario consists of several
steps. In Step 1, a basic, valid, stable instance of the sys-
tem model is created. This step is ideally the same for all
the scenarios. Step 2 prepares the system for the opera-
tion under investigation. At this point, we determine the set
of variables that the operation reads/writes from/to; this set
is called Frame Variable Set (FVS). Observation 7 in Sec-
tion 2.3 explains this concept in detail. After having ﬁxed
the set of variables that are of interest for the operation, we
create/delete objects and/or set the variables depending on
the pre/postcondition to be checked for conﬂicts. During
Step 3, the operation call is put into the call stack and the
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Step
No.
Step Description
1 Initial loading of
object model
An instance of the model is
loaded at this stage.
2 Environment Set-
ting (Preamble)
- Determ. of frame vars.
- Creation of objects
- Setting attribute values
3 Access to opera-
tion
The preconditions are
checked.
4 Modiﬁcation of the
model
- Creation of objects
- Deletion of objects
- Setting attribute values
- Modifying attribute val.
- Coverage of frame vars.
5 Exit from the oper-
ation
The postconditions are
checked.
Table 1. The steps of a basic scenario
preconditions of the operation are checked. Step 4 is the
step that the actions handled by the operation are carried
out. Creation/Deletion of objects, modifying attribute val-
ues are examples to these actions. If the value of an attribute
in the set of frame variables should not change, it is also
important to explicitly state this at this step. Note that if
we aim to create a scenario that creates a conﬂict with one
of the postconditions of the operation under investigation,
as mentioned in the third item above, it is Step 4 where we
need to form this conﬂict, i.e., mutant. In the ﬁnal step, we
exit the operation and the postconditions are checked if the
preconditions were satisﬁed (note that the words operation
and function are used interchangeably throughout the pa-
per). Table 2 summarises the statistics for all the scenarios
we created in our experiment. As given in the table, 237
scenarios are created of which 32 presents the ideal cases,
94 violate a precondition, 104 violate one postcondition and
7 violate more than one postcondition. Of these 237 scenar-
ios, 64 also conﬂict with an invariant. This means if this
scenario were to catch an error in the system, invariant fail-
ure would provide an alert as well. In addition to these, 98
scenarios require creation/deletion of objects and 71 sce-
narios are involved in nested calls. The importance of these
numbers will become more clear in the rest of this paper.
1.3 Contribution
There have been studies concentrating on the generation
of scenarios by using the USE tool for the validation of
models [9, 8, 1]. Although these studies indirectly suggest
the use of assertions, they mainly focus on the satisfaction
of invariants whilst creating the scenarios.
In our approach, we implement both invariants and
Scenarios
Total number of scenarios 237
Scen. presenting ideal case 32
Scen. conﬂicting preconditions 94
Scen. conﬂicting postconditions 111
Invariant conﬂict
Scen. conﬂicting 1 invariant 55
Scen. conﬂicting 2 invariants 9
Scen. satisfying all the invariants 170
State Change
Scen. that require state change within operation 40
Scen. that require state change outside the op. 23
Scen. that require no state change 171
Other information
Scen. requiring object deletion/creation 98
Scen. with nested calls 71
Scen. that change the value of at least 1 attribute 181
Table 2. The statistics about the scenarios
created in this study
pre/postconditions, but we base our scenarios on the satis-
faction/dissatisfaction of the assertions. By explaining our
experiences during the creation and execution of such sce-
narios, we aim not only to contribute to the overall disci-
pline in creating validation scenarios, but also to present:
• the complementary roles of assertions and invariants in
modelling a system
• the role of assertion-based scenarios in terms of model
validation
• the role of assertion-based scenarios in the generation
of abstract test cases
• the obstacles in creating and running independent sce-
narios
The importance of our work comes from the fact that we
can use models (including system models and scenarios) to
both carry out validation and generate test cases for the ac-
tual system. A challenge with this approach is in working
with abstract models. Because models are abstractions of
a real system, the scenarios we construct must also be ab-
stract; in particular, they must be general enough to apply
to different instances of the model with little or no modiﬁ-
cation. By achieving this, it should be easier to transform
these scenarios into test cases. We discuss this, and other
observations in Section 2.
Another issue to be aware of is that scenarios present-
ing the ideal case and the scenarios conﬂicting with pre-
conditions are those that wouldbe considered in the context
of blackbox testing. The creation of scenarios that violates
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postconditions needs mutants to be inserted into the opera-
tion (unless the operation is modeled incorrectly), thus, this
type of scenario creation can only be done if white-box test-
ing is considered to be applied on the system since right
type of mutants must be created and inserted into the oper-
ation under investigation. MBT is considered to be black-
box testing, therefore, the third type of scenarios may not
be of valuable for this purpose, however, as described in the
further sections, we ﬁnd them useful in terms of assertion
validation.
2 Observations on Scenario Creation in the
context of Model-Based Testing
In this section, we report our experiences in creating the
scenarios described above. We structure our observations
into three categories: tool-related observations, assertion-
related observations, general scenario formation-related
observations. The tool-related observations aim to reveal
the drawbacks and advantages of using the tool USE. The
assertion-related observations address the usage of the
pre/postconditions as well as the invariants in the process
of scenario creation. The observations in this category
mainly focus on how to detect some of the errors related
to assertions and how to write better assertions. The ﬁnal
category outlines the observations regarding the scenarios
that either show the ideal execution of an operation or
violate a pre/postcondition. For each observation, we
follow the template given below.
Short description of the observation
Aim: the aim of the action that produced the observation.
Context: in which environment the observation is made
Issue encountered: the unexpected behaviour
Detailed observation: the clear explanation of the issue
Conclusion: the effects of the problem
Extra notes: extra comments about the issue and its impacts
2.1 Tool-related observations
In this section, tool-related observations during the vali-
dation of assertions are discussed in detail.
Observation1: How is the call stack man-
aged in USE?
Aim: The aim here is to ﬁnd a scenario that would conﬂict
with a certain precondition of an operation.
Context: In USE, the preconditions of an operation are
checked when the command for the operation call -!openter-
is executed. If the preconditions of the operation are satis-
ﬁed, then the operation is put into the call stack. If the oper-
ation is deﬁned by OCL expressions, these are executed and
the expected value is returned when the !opexit command is
run. The postconditions of the operation are also veriﬁed at
this point.
Issue encountered: If the operation is not deﬁned by us-
ing OCL expressions, i.e. when the operation changes the
value of some variables, creates/deletes some objects, etc.,
then these sort of changes are performed via the commands
introduced in USE between the !openter and !opexit com-
mands. !set, !create, !destroy are some examples to such
commands.
The problematic situation occurs if the operation is de-
ﬁned by USE commands and the preconditions of the oper-
ation are not satisﬁed. In such a case, the operation is not
put into the call stack due to precondition failure, however,
the commands after the operation call are still executed, i.e.
the changes that the operation would do are still performed.
Then, when the !opexit command is called, the tool states
that the call stack is empty and do not check the postcon-
ditions assuming that the operation is not executed anyway.
The concern here is that the system may be in a different
state than it was in the beginning although the operation is
not executed according to the tool.
Observations: One of the operations in which we observed
this behaviour of the tool is given in Table 3. This op-
eration is called when the personal code is entered more
than the number of times stated by the attribute Personal-
CodeAttempts. The attribute NumberofIncorrectEntries is
increased each time the user enters an incorrect personal
code.
context MondexPurse::ChangeTheStateToLockedOut() :
Boolean
pre ChangeTheStateToLockedOutPre1:
self.LockingState = ’Unlocked’
or
self.LockingState = ’Locked’
pre ChangeTheStateToLockedOutPre2:
PersonalCodeAttempts <=
NumberOfIncorrectEntries
post ChangeTheStateToLockedOutPost1:
self.LockingState = ’LockedOut’
post ChangeTheStateToLockedOutPost2:
PersonalCodeAttempts = PersonalCodeAttempts@pre
Table 3. ChangeTheStateToLockedOut
Following code is the scenario that conﬂicts with the second
precondition of this operation.
<ChangeTheStateToLockedOut_Pre2.cmd>
read basemodel.cmd
--Setting the Frame Variables
!set P1.LockingState := ’Unlocked’
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--Conflict Creation
!set P1._NumberOfIncorrectEntries := 1
!set P1.PersonalCodeAttempts := 4
--Enter the operation\\
!openter P1 ChangeTheStateToLockedOut()
--Modification of Frame Variables
!set P1.LockingState := ’LockedOut’
--Exit the operation
!opexit true
Conclusion: In this example, we managed to reach our
aim in the sense that we found a scenario where the second
precondition fails, however, the system is now in a differ-
ent state than it was and this may cause unexpected results
when the next scenario is run.
Extra notes: The workaround we followed for this prob-
lem is that we executed the commands that neutralise the
modiﬁcations occurred during the execution of such a sce-
nario. Observation8 in Section 2.3 explains the process of
neutralisation in more detail.
Observation2: The reﬂection of the UML
syntactic rules onto USE
Aim: The aim is to ﬁnd a scenario that would conﬂict with
a postcondition of an operation that creates/deletes objects.
Issue encountered: In some of the scenarios, we cre-
ated/deleted extra objects. The rationale behind this has
been to observe whether the system is able to recog-
nise/react if an operation duplicates a creation/deletion.
In some cases, the tool USE throw the exception Multiplic-
ity Violation Error although the system after the execution
of the scenario satisﬁed all the invariants.
Observations: There are situations where the multiplicity
rules are not necessarily transformed into invariant form.
Especially, for 1 to 0..1 and 0..1 to 1 cases, the model may
only show the multiplicity rules by using UML syntax and
may not have an invariant stating that the number of certain
objects linked to certain other object can be at most one.
Conclusion: The restrictions modeled on UML diagrams,
the OCL invariants and pre/postconditions are complemen-
tary units. Their deﬁnitions can overlap and they may ad-
dress similar issues through different channels, but they all
contribute in their own way. In other words, the existence
of one does not make another redundant. The fact that USE
complies with the restrictions imposed by UML and that it
performs the syntactic checks for these rules is deﬁnitely a
feature that all the OCL-compliant tools must have.
Observation3: Decreasing the dependency
of scenarios to the instance of the model
Aim: In the creation of the scenarios, one of the rules we
need to follow is that we need to be reasonably independent
from the instance of the model we created. What we mean
by this is that the instance of the model created for the test
environment is just one of the many possible instances of
our model and the objects that exist in one instance may not
exist in another one. In other words, the number of objects,
the number of links, the name of the objects, the attribute
values may all be different. Since the scenarios in our ap-
proach are based on the instance of the model, it is true that
they are somewhat dependent on the instance chosen. Hav-
ing said that, the level of this dependency can be decreased
by using more general statements in the scenarios.
Context: If deleting an object is one of the operations han-
dled by an operation, some of the postconditions of this op-
eration must make sure that the deletion really occurs. The
observation that is explained in this section is made whilst
trying to ﬁnd a scenario that is related to one of these post-
conditions and that deletes an object.
Issue encountered: We realised that some of our at-
tempts to write more general statements in our scenarios
have caused exceptions in USE especially during the dele-
tion of an object.
Observations: The EnquireCurrencyInfo() function de-
ﬁned in our system provides information about a given cur-
rency. This information includes ISO Currency Code, the
number of digits hold for that currency, etc. One of the
postconditions of this function states that that the operation
should not modify currency objects. In our approach, as
explained in Section 1.2, we created scenarios that present
the ideal functioning of an operation and that also conﬂicts
with each different pre/postcondition of the operation. The
scenario that targets the postcondition mentioned above,
deletes a currency object and observes the reaction of the
system. Our ﬁrst attempt to delete the currency object had
the following code:
%The first option
let ObjectDel : MondexCurrency =
Purse1.avCurrencies->
select(ISOCurrencyCode =’GBP’)->
asSequence()->first()
!destroy ObjectDel
However, the ObjectDel object behaves like a pointer to the
actual object and therefore, the object that is requested to be
deleted is not deleted and we receive a RunTime Exception
- unbound variable - error. Our next attempt was to deﬁne
the object to be deleted as deﬁned in ObjectDel:
%The second option
!destroy Purse1.avCurrencies->
select(ISOCurrencyCode = ’GBP’)
->asSequence()->first()
This expression states that the the ﬁrst element in the set
of Currencies in Purse1 whose ISOCurrencyCode is GBP
should be deleted. This command carries out the task re-
quired, i.e. deletes the ﬁrst object in the selected collec-
tion. However, when we execute the !opexit command to
exit the operation, we received a Null Pointer Exception and
the postconditions are not checked.
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Our ﬁnal attempt was to execute the command that deletes
the object by calling its name:
%The third option
!destroy C_GBP1
After this command, the object is deleted, the postcondi-
tions are evaluated and no exception is thrown.
Conclusion: When we examine the scenario statements
written above, we see that the ﬁrst two need the same
amount of information in order to proceed, i.e. the currency
that is under investigation. This information is passed to
the function as a parameter anyway and therefore the user
does not necessarily have to know a lot about the current
instance of the model. The third one, on the other hand,
needs the knowledge of an object name which makes the
scenario extremely dependent on the selected instance of
the model. We tried these different options in different sce-
narios and noticed that in some situations the second - and
the more general - option works, however we are unable to
ﬁnd a pattern that explains the rationale behind this varying
behaviour. The main message we would like to give here
is that the tool must allow the user to write reasonably gen-
eral, OCL-based scenarios and the rules related to creation
and deletion of the objects must be clear.
2.2 Assertion-related observations
The observations made during the creation of pre/post-
conditions are given in this section. The situations where a
scenario highlights the importance of a change in the asser-
tions and in the invariants are also presented.
Observation4: Writing an invariant instead
of an assertion tuple
Aim: Some of the most important characteristics we would
like our model to have is clarity, consistency and simplicity.
The units forming the model such as diagrams and OCL
expressions must also have these characteristics and should
not introduce any extra complexity.
Context: Whilst creating the pre and postconditions of the
operations, it is important to understand the context of the
operation and the scope of the frame variables. In certain
cases, the change in one variable may affect another vari-
able and these changes must be presented in postconditions.
Issue encountered: For two conditions X and Y, if Y must
be true each time X holds, then this relationship must be
shown each time X appears in a pre/postcondition. If X is
a widely-used variable, i.e. is an element of frame variable
set of many operations, then Y must be repeated as many
times as X appears.
Observations: We ﬁrst noticed this whilst writing scenar-
ios for ChangeTheStateToUnlocked() function. Initially, the
deﬁnition of the function had the pre/postconditions shown
in Table 4.
context MondexPurse::
ChangeTheStateToUnlocked() : Boolean
pre ChangeTheStateToUnlockedPre1:
LockingState = ’NonLocking’
or LockingState = ’Locked’
pre ChangeTheStateToUnlockedPre2:
LockingState = ’NonLocking’ implies
(not PersonalCode.isDeﬁned or PersonalCode = 0)
post ChangeTheStateToUnlockedPost1:
LockingState = ’Unlocked’
post ChangeTheStateToUnlockedPost2:
PersonalCode.isDeﬁned and PersonalCode <> 0
Table 4. ChangeTheStateToUnlocked - First
version
We then realised that each time the state is in Nonlocking
state or changes from Nonlocking state to any other possible
state, we have to check the value of Personal Code even if
the operation itself does not necessarily state a change in
the value of Personal Code. This not only creates many
duplicates of the same requirement, but also creates a hole
in the system when it is forgotten.
To avoid this, we created the following invariant:
inv iPerCode_Nonlocking:
(LockingState = ’Nonlocking’ implies
(PersonalCode = 0 or
not PersonalCode.isDefined()))
and
(LockingState <> ’Nonlocking’ implies
(PersonalCode <> 0 and
PersonalCode.isDefined()))
This invariant states that if the system is in Nonlocking
state, the Personal Code is either zero or not deﬁned. When
the system is in any other state, the personal code has a
value other than zero. After the introduction of this invari-
ant, the pre/postcondition deﬁnition of the above function
became as given in Table 5. As a result, all the related
context MondexPurse::
ChangeTheStateToUnlocked() : Boolean
pre ChangeTheStateToUnlockedPre1:
LockingState = ’NonLocking’
or LockingState=’Locked’
post ChangeTheStateToUnlockedPost1:
LockingState = ’Unlocked’
Table 5. ChangeTheStateToUnlocked - Sec-
ond version
pre/postconditions are erased since they are covered with
the newly introduced invariant anyway.
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Conclusion: If there is a repetition of pre/postconditions,
it is worth looking at the relationship between the variables
under investigation to see whether such a relationship would
hold for all cases. The example given above is a good ex-
ample of a case where we noticed the need for an invariant
due to this repetition.
Observation5: Incorrect invariant detection
Aim: The rationale behind creating scenarios that violates
a pre/postcondition is to be able to construct abstract test
cases to challenge our system. One of the advantages of the
process of scenario-creation is that it also allows us to test
our own model for correctness and consistency.
Context: It is possible to ﬁnd a set of scenarios that vio-
lates an assertion of an operation. The choice of scenario to
be used can be done simply by the user or a set of criteria
can be deﬁned and the scenarios may be expected to comply
with some/all of these criteria.
Issue encountered: In certain circumstances, we re-
alised that the set of scenarios that aim to conﬂict a
pre/postcondition of an operation must also violate an in-
variant. In one of these situations, the invariant that the sce-
nario was supposed to violate seems to be satisﬁed. After
close examination, we found out that the predicate in the
invariant was incorrectly written.
Observations: One of the preconditions of the function
ReadPaymentLogs() is that the system must either be in
state Unlocked or Locked. There are two possible scenarios
that would violate this precondition: the scenario that sets
the system state to Nonlocking and the scenario that sets it
to LockedOut. The invariant that deals with the cases where
the state is Nonlocking -iPerCode Nonlocking- was given
in Observation4. The invariant that checks the suitability of
system variables for the LockedOut state -iLockedOutState-
is given below.
inv iLockedOutState :
LockingState = ’LockedOut’ implies
(PurseExhaustionFlag = true
or
_NumberOfIncorrectEntries >=
PersonalCodeAttempts)
Both of these invariants require that some other variables of
the system are set to certain values. In the scenarios created
to conﬂict the precondition about the state of the system,
we ﬁrst followed the approach where the system state is set
to LockedOut or Nonlocking and all the relevant variables
such as Personal Code, PurseExhaustionFlag, etc. are ex-
cluded. This is why we expected that each scenario would
conﬂict at least with the relevant invariant. However, to our
surprise, the invariant iPerCode NonLocking was satisﬁed
in both cases. When we analysed the problem further, we
realised that the invariant in the form of
(p implies q) AND (NOT p implies r)
was written as
(p implies q) AND NOT p implies r
which was interpreted as
(p implies q) AND NOT p) implies r
by the tool and therefore the invariant was satisﬁed although
it should not have been. The issue is resolved when the
fault in the invariant is corrected.
Conclusion: The example above presents a case
where a scenario written with the aim of violating a
pre/postcondition also detects a fault in the model itself.
This means that the approach supports the process of
correctness and consistency check for the model itself.
Further research is needed to assess to what degree this
support extends.
Extra notes: Note that, whilst creating the scenarios
discussed above, the variables that the invariants are
associated to are excluded, i.e. the scenario did not
deal with the setting of variables such as PersonalCode,
PurseExhhaustionFlag, etc. As an alternative, we also
created scenarios that add these variables to the FVS of the
operation and that handles the correct setting of these extra
variables for the given scenario. By doing this, we bring the
system in a different stable state and then observe the cases
where the precondition under investigation fails, but all the
invariants are satisﬁed. This issue is brieﬂy discussed again
in Observation7 in Section 2.3.
Observation6: Overlapping postconditions
- Independent eﬀect of each postcondition
Aim: In our experiments, we create the scenarios that ide-
ally violate only one pre/postcondition at a time. We believe
that the possibility of ﬁnding an error increases when each
scenario is dealt with a different assertion since the domain
of a possible error differs when the subject matter is differ-
ent in a scenario.
Context: In OCL, there may be several ways of navigating
to reach an object. Some operations may create even more
links and increase the number of navigation possibilities.
If such operations have postconditions, the postconditions
may also use different navigation routes.
Issue encountered: We noticed that when postconditions
use the links created by the operation under investigation,
they happen to assume that the links are created success-
fully. In other words, they also check the creation of links
in addition to their main goal. This conﬂicts with our initial
aim.
Observations: Following assertions were two of the post-
conditions initially written for the function SendValue().
post SendValuePost1 :
pockets->select(Default = true
and
currency.ISOCurrencyCode = p_ISOCurrCode)
->size() = 1
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post SendValuePost4 :
pockets->select(Default = true)->
asSequence()->first().Value@pre -
pockets->select(Default = true)->
asSequence()->first().Value =
p_PaymentValue
SendValuePost1 states that the pocket that carries the re-
quested currency given by the parameter p ISOCurrCode
is the one that is default. In other words, this postcondition
ensures that the pocket that carries the currency in which the
amount will be transferred is set as the default pocket. The
postcondition SendValuePost4 ensures that the value held
by the pocket from which the amount is transferred is de-
creased by p PaymentValue.
At ﬁrst sight, both conditions seem to match their deﬁni-
tions as given above. However, when analysed further, we
noticed that when the ﬁrst condition fails, both postcondi-
tions fail even if the money is transferred in correct cur-
rency. This is because SendValuePost4 assumes that the de-
fault pocket is set properly and therefore tries to reach the
object through a newly deﬁned link. For instance, if the
transfer is made in GBP and the pocket that holds GBP is
not set as default, but transfer is made in GBP successfully,
then we expect SendValuePost1 to fail and post SendValue-
Post4 to pass. We observed that both of the above post-
conditions fail for such a scenario. This may seem as an
advantage at ﬁrst sight, but when we try to detect the root
cause of such a failure, it is more difﬁcult to ﬁnd and we are
unable to say which assertion is the main target of such a
scenario.
The solution to this is to separate the concerns as much
as possible for each pre/postcondition. This also requires
withdrawing the sequential way of thinking to reach the out-
come of an operation. In the above example, one may think
that the ﬁrst action is the change of the default pocket and
then the value transfer occurs, so the rationale behind writ-
ing a postcondition like SendValuePost4 may be the result
of such reasoning. To overcome this issue, we changed the
SendValuePost4 as below:
post SendValuePost4 :
pockets->select
(currency.ISOCurrencyCode@pre =
p_ISOCurrCode)
->asSequence()->first().Value@pre -
pockets->select
(currency.ISOCurrencyCode =
p_ISOCurrCode)
->asSequence()->first().Value =
p_PaymentValue
This new version of SendValuePost subtracts the previous
and current values of the pocket that holds the currency in
which the payment is made. In this version, there is no as-
sumption about any of the actions that the function under
investigation must take prior to money transfer. As a result
of this, the failure in SendValuePost1 does not necessarily
mean a failure in SendValuePost4.
Conclusion: There are several conclusions we can reach
by looking at this example. The ﬁrst one is the im-
portance of demonstrating the independent effect of each
pre/postcondition. This is similar to that of Modiﬁed Con-
dition/Decision Coverage (MC/DC), which is a structural
coverage criterion that requires that the effect of all con-
ditions in a program are demonstrated and that there is
no condition that does not affect the outcome of a deci-
sion. [12]. Analogous to this criterion, in our approach,
we create scenarios - that would then form the abstract test
cases - based on the pre/postconditions and therefore, it is
important to be able to see the independent effect of each
unit, i.e. pre/postcondition. By showing the independent
effect, we not only avoid the possibility of an assertion be-
ing masked by another assertion, but also let each assertion
contribute to the ﬁnal test suite.
In addition to this, separation of concerns also makes root
cause analysis easier when a fault is detected. In other
words, if an error occurs during the execution of a test case
that is based on a scenario created by using our approach,
we can backtrack and reason about the error by looking at
the part of the program that deals with the postcondition
under investigation.
2.3 General Scenario Formation-related
observations
Scenarios form the core of our approach and therefore
it is crucial to investigate carefully the way they are writ-
ten, how well they express their aim in conﬂicting an asser-
tion and the factors that affect their execution. This section
presents the issues encountered during the scenario creation
and execution.
Observation7: Frame variables and treat-
ments to frame variables
Aim: In most cases, the operations of a system do not have
to read/write from/to all the attributes of the model. The
set of attributes that an operation is in contact with is called
frame variables [6]. The Frame Variable Set (FVS) serves
as a completeness check for the operation in the sense that
it includes all the variables that must appear in the deﬁni-
tion of the operation. The elements of FVS can be analysed
under two categories: static elements (those that are only
read), dynamic elements (those that are modiﬁed by the op-
eration). Correct determination of frame variables is essen-
tial in order to be able to systematically monitor the state
of the system after the execution of an operation, therefore
in our observations we aim to ﬁnd the guidelines to reach a
reasonably complete set of frame variables.
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Context: By deﬁnition, if a variable is read/modiﬁed dur-
ing the execution of an operation, it is considered to be in-
cluded in the FVS.
Issue encountered: During the course of scenario creation,
we noticed that the above deﬁnition alone is not sufﬁcient
to cover all the frame variables. There are various external
factors such as invariants, nested calls, etc. that require the
use of other variables than those listed in the initial form of
FVS of an operation.
Observations: Following is a list of some of the cases that
must be considered in the determination of FVS:
• If an operation calls another operation from within, ei-
ther the elements of the FVS of the called function is
added to that of callee function, or the FVSs do not
change. Note that, in theory, a static element of callee
function’s FVS should not be a dynamic element of the
called function’s FVS.
• As explained in Observation5, the change of a variable
value may cause an invariant conﬂict. If the conﬂict is
due to another variable that is not even considered in
the scenario, then we have two routes to follow. We ei-
ther count these scenarios that conﬂict with invariants
as test cases, or frame variable set will be extended
in order to cover the variables required by the invari-
ant and new scenarios that do not conﬂict with the in-
variants will be created. So, the point to consider is
whether to include the variables that are associated to
already existing frame variables through an invariant.
• Another issue that must be taken into account in FVS
determination is the case of derived attributes. OCL
supports the deﬁnition of derived attributes that are
preﬁxed with / in UML and we explained brieﬂy
how we dealt with derived attributes in [11]. Cur-
rently, there is no automatic way of assigning the
value of these attributes. In the context of frame
variables, this brings extra work since the opera-
tion may not directly use the derived attribute, but
if at least one of the dynamic variables included
in its FVS set is the variable that affects the value
of the derived attribute, then the derived attribute
should also be modiﬁed accordingly. An example
to this can be given by explaining the changes in
NumberOfUnusedExceptions. This derived attribute
is calculated by subtracting the exceptionlogs− >
size() value from cMaxExceptionNo constant.
When an exception occurs, the system calls CreateEx-
ceptionLog() function. This function creates an extra
exception log if the current number of exceptions does
not exceed a certain value. Since the value of CMax-
ExceptionNo is constant, but the size of exception logs
changes during the course of this operation, we have to
include NumberOfUnusedExceptions in the FVS and
change the value of the attribute accordingly. This also
allows us to use it as a counter in the various other
functions.
Conclusion: The list presented above is not a complete list
by any means, but we believe it demonstrates the need for
the extension of FVS through different channels and if this
concept is to be integrated into OCL tools, it is necessary
that the aforementioned issues are considered.
Observation8: Running scenarios one after
the other - how to avoid them aﬀecting each
other’s territory
Aim: It is important to ﬁnd the patterns that would help us
automate our technique and/or integrate it with other tech-
niques that are automated. In the context of scenario cre-
ation, automation is not only important in forming the sce-
narios, but also in executing them one after the other.
Context: When the instance of the system model is exer-
cised by a scenario, the scenario brings the system into a
certain state. This new state may be the same as the old one
if the scenario does not perform any changes on any of the
existing objects and does not create/delete any objects. In
this case, a second scenario can be run straight after the ﬁrst
one, since the system is in its initial, stable state. Clearly,
each scenario assumes that the system is in a state that ac-
cepts the further requests to be made by itself. This assump-
tion comes from Step1 on Table 1.
Issue encountered: If the ﬁrst scenario makes modiﬁca-
tions on the initial instance of the model, then the assump-
tions made by the second scenario may not hold. Thus, the
question that arise in the context of scenario execution is
that how the process of running several scenarios one after
the other can be achieved especially in the presence of those
that modify the system. The following are two solutions to
this problem:
• System reset: After each scenario, the system can be
reset to its initial state by performing Step1 on Table 1.
• Neutralisation: Actions that would erase the effects of
the last scenario can be carried out.
Observations: During the execution of our scenarios, we
used both of the above techniques. Neutralisation requires
undoing the actions taken by the scenario under investiga-
tion. For instance, if the scenario creates an object, the ob-
ject and all its links to other objects must be deleted during
the neutralisation process. This may seem straightforward,
but it enforces to analyse all sorts of different actions and
executing commands that ultimately has the opposite effect
of these actions. This is a rigorous process especially if the
scenario has nested calls and object deletions.
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In order to apply the Neutralisation technique, we need to
undo the actions in the reverse order. Adjusting the value in
default pocket by addition, deleting the payment log that
holds the details for a transaction, changing the default
pocket to its previous form, creating the previously exist-
ing exception logs are some of the actions carried out in
order to neutralise the effect of the scenarios. This list only
gives a rough idea about the actions that needs to be done
before executing the next scenario. When we examine fur-
ther, we realised that the elaboration of neutralisation pro-
cess requires thorough analysis of program semantics and
the process itself includes :
• Storage of the previous values (in order to restore them
later)
• Implementation of reverse functions, i.e., functions
that has the opposite effect of existing functions
On the other hand, system reset only requires the re-
compilation of the model and the execution of the ﬁrst line
in the scenario -read basemodel.cmd-.
Conclusion: Neutralisation and system reset are two solu-
tions to the problem of running scenarios one after another.
System reset may mean the initialisation of the whole model
and depending on the technology used and the system en-
vironment, this may require extra memory space and ad-
justment of certain environment variables. However, during
this research, system reset option has been used extensively
in order to save time.
3 Future Work and Conclusion
In this paper, some of the observations made during the
creation and execution of scenarios for validation of asser-
tions have been outlined. The importance of independent
scenarios, the effect of overlapping postconditions, the im-
portance of the frame variable set and the ability to carry
out successive executions of scenarios are some examples
of observations that are not only applicable in the context of
USE tool, but are also relevant for other tools that support
scenario creation and execution. We believe that these ob-
servations explain how scenarios for exercising assertions
can be deﬁned in a structured manner and what sort of
obstacles can be experienced, thus leading us to a better
model, and helping to form the basis for test case genera-
tion through model artifacts.
In the next phase of our work, we will focus on automatic
generation of these scenarios and ultimately transform them
into abstract test cases. Integration of ASSL (A Snapshot
and Sequence Language) is likely to happen since there is
previous work based on the conﬂict of invariants in USE
[7, 8] and the possibility of applying this technique to asser-
tions is still open to further research.
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